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Abstract
This is the first study exploring the causal effect of education on teenage fertility
in Argentina. We exploit an exogenous variation in education from the staggered
implementation of the 1993 reform, which increased compulsory schooling from
7 to 10 years. We find a negative overall impact of education on teenage fertility
rates, which operates through two complementing channels: a human capital effect
(one additional year of schooling causes a decline of 30 births per 1000 girls) and
a weaker ‘incapacitation’ effect (a rise of one percentage point in enrollment rate
reduces 3 births per 1000 girls).
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1 Introduction
Early motherhood represents a major challenge for policymakers in those countries
committed to the Millennium Development Goals (Jiménez et al. 2011; Williamson
2013). In particular, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is the second region
(following Africa) with the highest teenage fertility rate in the world, with 68 births per
1000 women between the ages of 15 and 19 (United Nations 2013). While in most
LAC countries teenage fertility rates declined in the last decade, in Argentina, rates
increased sharply since 2003 as indicated in Fig. 1. Data also indicate high heterogen-
eity across provinces: rates for Argentina’s northeast region are nearly equal to those in
Sub-Saharan Africa, as it can be observed in Fig. 2.
Teenage pregnancy is associated with several adverse consequences for child health
(Azevedo et al. 2012). These risks include low birth weight, pre-term delivery, and neo-
natal and infant mortality. These consequences are more severe when the mother is
young (14 years of age or less). Table 1 shows these effects for Argentina, according to
the age of the mother.
Early childbearing also corresponds to adverse intra-generational socioeconomic
consequences for the mothers (lower educational achievement and poorer labor mar-
ket outcomes) and inter-generational negative socioeconomic consequences for the
child (engagement in risky behaviors). In addition, being born to a teenage mother is
associated with higher risk of a teenage birth (binding inter-generational poverty traps).
Beyond the individual costs associated with the phenomenon, teenage pregnancy has a
IZA Journal of Development
and Migration
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
indicate if changes were made.
Alzúa and Velázquez IZA Journal of Development and Migration  (2017) 7:7 
DOI 10.1186/s40176-017-0100-8
considerable public cost: there are significant health and welfare costs, as teen mothers
are more likely to participate in social programs and become dependent on social
assistance income (Azevedo et al. 2012).
Education is a key determinant of fertility choices1, and its effects may occur through
different channels. The first causal channel relies on human capital theory and under-
stands education as an investment for the future: education raises future earnings and,
ultimately, the opportunity cost of early childbearing (Becker 1960, 1981).2 The nega-
tive effect of female education on fertility could be stronger under positive assortative
mating (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002).3 Second, education may also operate through
a delay of first births during the teenage years4 through a pure ‘incapacitation’ or ‘incar-
ceration’ effect: keeping teenagers in school, under adult supervision, limits their time/
opportunities to engage in risky behavior like unprotected sex. Such birth postpone-
ment may also be related to the role incompatibility of enrollment in the educational
system and motherhood (Black et al. 2008).
Human capital and incapacitation effects are by no means the only channels by which
education could affect fertility. Education not only enhances women’s knowledge about
contraception and reproductive health (via curricula) but also teaches reasoning skills
which foster knowledge after leaving school, i.e., education is associated with higher
productivity in the production of health (Grossman 1972). Furthermore, the experience
of going to school provides women with greater confidence and skills in accessing mod-
ern institutions, including the health care system and family planning services. Educa-
tion also serves as a socialization process that shapes attitudes, values, and aspirations,
providing greater awareness of alternative lifestyles. Schooling may empower women’s
sense of control over their body and destiny by giving them greater autonomy in
domestic decision-making (including the use of contraception) and increasing reliance
on science and technology (Cleland 2002).
Although a vast empirical literature shows a negative relationship between female
education and early fertility (for international references, see Azevedo et al. 2012; for
LAC countries, see Flórez and Núñez 2001; for Argentina, see Fig. 3), it is difficult to
establish a causal relationship due to endogeneity problems. Human capital accumula-
tion and reproductive decisions are either joint decisions, which result in a potential
Fig. 1 Teenage fertility rate. Argentina, 1960–2011 (number of live births per 1000 women aged 15–19).
Source: Data for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2001 from Pantelides and Binstock (2007). The solid line
corresponds to information provided by Office of Health Statistics DEIS
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Fig. 2 Teenage fertility rates by province. Argentina, 2011 (number of live births per 1000 women aged 15-
19). Note: CABA City of Buenos Aires (Federal District). Source: Office of Health Statistics DEIS;
own calculations
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reverse causality problem or are both affected by unobservable factors, causing selec-
tion bias.
Some recent studies used different methodological approaches to overcome selection bias
and reverse causality problems, thus isolating the ‘pure’ effect of education on teenage fertil-
ity. Experimental or quasi-experimental research designs have exploited policies that reduce
schooling costs (direct and opportunity costs) and increase enrollment (i.e., Conditional
Cash Transfer programs and enrollment subsidies), differences in age-at-school-entry pol-
icies, reforms that extended the length of the school day, and reforms that extended com-
pulsory schooling. Empirical evidence for OECD countries (Black et al. 2008; Silles 2011;
Cygan-Rehm and Maeder 2013)5 and Africa (Baird et al. 2011; Duflo et al. 2015) supports
the hypothesis that education reduces fertility among youth. However, evidence for LAC
countries is mixed. On the one hand, the cross-country analysis of Alzúa et al. (2016) based
on 22 LAC countries6 finds that education has no impact on teenage fertility for the
region. On the other hand, there is evidence that education negatively affects teen-
age fertility for Colombia, Chile, and the Dominican Republic (Cortés et al. 2010,
2016; Berthelon and Kruger 2011; and Novella and Ripani 2016).
The evidence gap for LAC countries may be attributed to the country-specific factors
analyzed by Cortés et al. (2010, 2016) for Colombia, Berthelon and Kruger (2011) for
a b
Fig. 3 Teenage fertility rate (number of live births per 1000 women aged 15–19) and education (women
aged 25–40), by province. Argentina, 2011. a Years of schooling (mean). b Incomplete secondary education
(%). Note: CABA City of Buenos Aires (Federal District). Source: Office of Health Statistics DEIS and Argentina
Household Survey EPH - SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank); own calculations
Table 1 Health and demographic indicators by age of the mother. Argentina, 2012
Mother’s age (years) Total
10–14 15–19 20–34 35–49 10–49
Gestational length (weeks) 38.27 (0.044) 38.59 (0.006) 38.62 (0.003) 38.35 (0.006) 38.58 (0.002)
Premature (<37 weeks gestation)a 12.73 (0.61) 9.28 (0.09) 7.89 (0.04) 10.31 (0.09) 8.49 (0.03)
Birth weight (grams) 3088 (10.58) 3202 (1.66) 3289 (0.78) 3257 (1.81) 3270 (0.66)
Very low birth weight (<1500 g)a 2.17 (0.27) 1.35 (0.03) 0.98 (0.01) 1.37 (0.03) 1.10 (0.01)
Low birth weight ( 1,500 - 2,499 grams)a 9.27 (0.53) 6.78 (0.08) 5.60 (0.03) 7.24 (0.08) 6.04 (0.03)
Infant mortality rate (<1 year)b 15.56 (2.25) 9.72 (0.29) 6.61 (0.11) 7.04 (0.25) 7.19 (0.1)
Neonatal mortality rate (<28 days)b 9.93 (1.8) 6.56 (0.24) 4.54 (0.09) 5.01 (0.21) 4.94 (0.08)
Maternal mortality ratec 3.31 (3.31) 2.97 (0.52) 3.00 (0.24) 6.58 (0.77) 3.54 (0.22)
Live births 3020 111,272 502,625 110,872 727,789
Notes: standard error of mean in parentheses. Source: Estadísticas Vitales 2012 (DEIS); own calculations
aPer 100 live births
bPer 1000 live births
cPer 10,000 live births
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Chile, Novella and Ripani (2016) for the Dominican Republic, and Alzúa et al. (2016)
for the entire LAC region. Also, due to methodological differences, the impacts they
intend to capture are different. While Alzúa et al. (2016) and Cortés et al. (2010,
2016) try to capture the impact of an increase in years of education, Berthelon and
Kruger (2011) capture the impact of an increase in the length of school day and
Novella and Ripani (2016) capture the impact of non-formal education (from a job
training program). Although both Cortés et al. (2010, 2016) and Alzúa et al. (2016)
attempt to estimate the impact of years of schooling, they exploit different sources
of exogenous variation in education with different levels of compliances. In Cortés
et al. (2010, 2016), compliance is very high because they exploit a CCT program
for which the cash transfer is conditional on school attendance (and academic
performance); Alzúa et al. (2016) rely on mandatory schooling laws, which are dif-
ficult to enforce (particularly in economies with high informality, such as LAC
countries).
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of education on teenage fertil-
ity for Argentina and helps to shed light on the conflicting evidence for LAC. We
exploit a natural experiment: an education reform (Ley Federal de Educación, 1993)
that, among several features, increased compulsory schooling from 7 to 10 years.
Although it was a national reform, its actual implementation was driven by political
reasons and varied substantially across provinces (Alzúa et al. 2015). Differences in the
timing and degree of implementation provide a source of identification for unraveling
the causal effect of education on teenage fertility using an Instrumental Variables
approach. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study exploring the case of
Argentina.
We use an annual panel dataset at the birth-cohort/province level for the period
1995-2006. Results provide evidence for a positive impact of education reform on edu-
cational outcomes (first-stage relationship). In fact, the implementation of the reform
(extensive margin) had a statistically significant and positive effect range, from 0.24 to
0.27 additional years of schooling. It also produced an increase in school enrollment
rates in the range of 2.6 to 3 percentage points. However, the reform’s progress and
expansion (intensive margin) showed no impact on human capital or enrollment.
We find evidence for a statistically significant negative overall impact of education on
the fertility decisions of teenagers. This overall effect is found to operate through two
complementing education channels: a human capital effect (one additional year of
schooling reduces teenage fertility rate by roughly 26.9 to 35.5 per thousand points)
and a weaker ‘incapacitation’ effect (a rise of one percentage point in enrollment rate
reduces the teenage fertility rate by roughly 2.4 to 3.3 per thousand points). Crosta
(2007) found that the 1993 education reform reduced repetition rates, which may
explain the weak ‘incapacitation’ effect (similar to the case of Malawi; Grant 2015).
Our results are in line with those reported by Cortés et al. (2010, 2016), Berthelon
and Kruger (2011), and Novella and Ripani (2016), but they contradict recent evidence
from Alzúa et al. (2016). The conflicting evidence may be due to Argentina’s specific
characteristics, which are different from the rest of the region. It may also be due to a
delay between the time congresses passed the educational law and its actual imple-
mentation. While we exploit the effective implementation of the education reform, Alzúa
et al. (2016) rely on laws passed in different years across different countries. Although
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the estimated effects are very large, we should interpret the results as a local aver-
age treatment effect (LATE) for the group complying with the reform (i.e., for
young people who did not leave school after 7 years because of the reform). This
group is not necessarily representative of the overall population.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the
compulsory schooling changes used for identification, describes the data used in this
study, and lays out the methodology. Section 3 presents the main findings and Section
4 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
We identify the causal effect of education on fertility by applying an Instrumental Vari-
ables approach to deal with the endogeneity of education. Following Black et al. (2008),
Silles (2011), Cygan-Rehm and Maeder (2013), and Alzúa et al. (2016), we use an edu-
cation reform that extended the number of years of compulsory schooling in Argentina
(Ley Federal de Educación) as an instrument for education. Our identification strategy
takes advantage of an exogenous variation in education generated from the staggered
implementation of the reform, which was driven by political reasons uncorrelated with
fertility trends.
2.1 The educational reform
Passed into law in April 1993, the Ley Federal de Educación (henceforth LFE)7
provided the legislative framework for an increase in the number of years of com-
pulsory schooling, from 7 to 10, in Argentina. It also introduced a significant
change in the structure of the educational curricula. Specifically, it replaced 7 years
of primary school and 5 years of secondary school with a 9-year uniform cycle
called the Educación General Básica (EGB) and a 3-year specialized cycle named
Polimodal. Pre-primary education for children aged five and EGB were made
mandatory. The law applies to both public and private schools in every province.
Table 2 shows the structure of the educational system before and after the reform.
Table 2 also shows how the change in mandatory schooling affects teenagers aged
14 or younger, showing the age at which children are supposed to reach each level.
However, in Argentina, the over-age rates are quite high (18.8% in primary level and
38.1% in secondary education, according to DINIECE 2011).
One of the main goals of the LFE was to reduce the high dropout rate in the initial
years of secondary education. Indeed, implementation of the reform increased access to
secondary education and reduced dropout and repetition rates (Crosta 2007). In
addition, LFE had other unintended effects: a positive impact on labor outcomes (Alzúa
et al. 2015) and a reduction in youth crime (López 2012).
As preliminary evidence of the effects of LFE reform on education, Fig. 4 visually rep-
resents the effect that this legislation had on increasing average years of schooling in
formal education (panel A) and school enrollment (panel B). Enrollment rates
responded faster than years of schooling. The average number of years of educa-
tion for youths aged 10–14 has increased over the decade, from 5.4 years in 1995
to about 5.9 years in 2005. For older teenagers, aged 15–19 years, average years of
schooling increased from 9.2 in 1995 to 9.9 in 2005. Enrollment rates for youths
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aged 10–14 neared 100%, increasing from 96% in 1995 to 98% in 2001. For youths
aged 15–19, after LFE school enrollment increased by 13 percentage points, up
from the pre-reform level of 63%.
Since 1991, primary and secondary public education are administered and financed at
the provincial level (previously secondary schools were in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment). It was expected that the implementation of the reform would increase pres-
sure on educational facilities. Provincial governments required larger budgets for
investing in infrastructure and teachers’ wages, i.e., provinces required federal govern-
ment cash transfers. For that reason, provinces were more likely to implement the re-
form early and massively if its governing political party was the same as the national
governing party (Alzúa et al. 2015).
The timing and degree of the implementation of the law differed substantially across
provinces (see Table 3). Between the years 1996 and 2000, provincial governments trig-
gered the education reform. While in some provinces the reform was quickly and mas-
sively implemented, in others, the changes were put into practice more gradually,
involving a much smaller percentage of schools and students (pilot program). More-
over, in two districts (City of Buenos Aires and Río Negro), the reform was never im-
plemented. Furthermore, the reform was applied gradually as cohorts reached the age
of EGB3 entry (12 years old). Thus, it took a considerable time for the Polimodal to be
implemented (Crosta 2007). For all of these reasons, exposure to the reform depended
on birth-cohort and province of residence.
2.2 Data
Since exposure to the reform depended on age and province of residence, we construct a
yearly panel dataset at birth-cohort/province level for the period 1995–2006. In 2007, a
new education reform (Law 26206) aimed to return to the old structure of the educational
curricula and raise the age of compulsory schooling again (from 10 to 13 years); we de-
cided to exclude this period from the analysis.
Table 2 Educational structure before and after the reform
Notes: Areas shaded in gray indicate compulsory schooling. Source: DINIECE, Ministry of Education
EGB Educación General Básica
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We assume that most women who become pregnant during a given school year
(March–December) t, will give birth the following year t + 1. Hence, fertility outcomes,
such as births, reflect choices taken a year previous. Birth-cohorts run from 1977 to
1994, but they are included only for the teenage years (12–18 years old).
Teenage fertility rates are the number of live births8 per 1000 girls. We include in the
analysis fertility information for girls ages 13–19.9 The number of live births by age and
the province of residence of the mother were provided by the Office of Health Statistics
DEIS. The National Statistics Institute INDEC provided data on female population,
available by province of residence and 5-year age groups (we assigned the data into
single years of age using Sprague’s multipliers; Siegel and Swanson 2004).
In addition, we use two different measures for education: average years of schooling (as
a proxy of human capital effect) and enrollment rates (as a proxy of ‘incapacitation’ ef-
fect). Unfortunately, we cannot capture the other mechanisms we briefly discussed above.
Education outcomes by sex, age, and province of residence were calculated from the
Argentina Household Survey EPH using SEDLAC database (CEDLAS and the World
Bank). The survey sample includes 15 provinces for the entire period and 8 provinces
since 1998 (see Table 4 for details). Unfortunately, for the period 1995–2006, EPH has no
information from the province of Río Negro, where the reform was never implemented.
Two complementary indicators measure the implementation of the reform. First,
we use Crosta (2007) as a source for the timing of the reform in provinces and we
assigned compulsory attendance laws defining a dummy variable on the basis of
province of residence and the year when the girl was 14 years old (see Table 4 and
Fig. 7 in the Appendix). Second, we use information from the DINIECE (Ministry
of Education) to calculate the share of students in Polimodal for each province
(following Alzúa et al. 2015; and López 2012). This second indicator captures (i)
differences in school construction rates and/or percentage of schools that imple-
mented the reform across provinces; (ii) the fact that the reform was applied grad-
ually, as cohorts reached the age of 12 (the age of EGB3 entry), with considerable
additional time to reach Polimodal. We will interpret the dummy variable as the
extensive margin of the reform, and the share of students in Polimodal as an indi-
cator of the reform’s progress and expansion (intensive margin).
Fig. 4 Argentina, 1995–2006. a Years of schooling (mean). Argentina, 1992–2006. b Gross enrollment rates
by age (%). Notes: a Years of schooling in formal education available since 1995; b share of a given
population attending any educational level. LFE: Ley Federal de Educación (Law 24195). Source: Argentina
Household Survey EPH - SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank); own calculations
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Finally, we use economic cycle indicators (provincial GDP and unemployment rates)
and public policy indicators (public expenditure on education and health, and Plan
Nacer10 beneficiaries) as covariates.
In summary, we have an unbalanced panel dataset with 1764 observations at birth-
cohort/province level for the period 1995–2006, with information about fertility of
women ages 13–19, education outcomes for women ages 12–18, implementation of the
LFE, and other covariates which capture economic activity, unemployment, public ex-
penditure on education and health, and Plan Nacer beneficiaries. Table 4 summarizes
the indicators we will use for our estimations and their sources.
2.3 Identification strategy
For our identification strategy, the following equations are used:
FRc; j; tþ1 ¼ βEducc;j;t þ γXj;t þ μc;j þ δt þ εc;j;t ð1Þ
Educc; j; t ¼ ϕLFEc;j;t þ ψPolimodalj;t þ αXj;t þ ηc;j þ λt þ νc;j;t ð2Þ
FRc; j; tþ1 ¼ ξLFEc;j;t þ τPolimodalj;t þ πXj;t þ ρc;j þ σ t þ ωc;j;t ð3Þ
where FRc,j,t + 1 in Eq. 1 is the fertility rate in year t + 1 of teenagers living in province j,
Table 3 Year of implementation of LFE by province
Province Year
Buenos Aires 1996
CABA NI
Catamarca 1999
Chaco 1997
Chubut 1999
Córdoba 1996
Corrientes 1997
Entre Ríos 1997
Formosa 1998
Jujuy 1998
La Pampa 1997
La Rioja 1999
Mendoza 2000
Misiones 1998
Neuquén 1998
Río Negro NI
Salta 1998
San Juan 1997
San Luis 1998
Santa Cruz 1998
Santa Fe 1997
Santiago del Estero 1998
Tucumán 1998
Tierra del Fuego 1998
Source: Crosta (2007)
NI not implement, CABA City of Buenos Aires (Federal District)
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belonging to birth-cohort c. Educc,j,t represents two different measures of teenagers’
educational attainment in year t: average years of schooling and enrollment rate. Xj,t
represents other covariates (economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on
education and health, and Plan Nacer beneficiaries); δt is a set of dummy variables indi-
cating the year (to control for aggregate shocks); μc,j is a set of dummy variables indi-
cating birth-cohort/province fixed effects; and εc,j,t standard errors clustered at the
birth-cohort/province level.
When estimating Eq. 1, we should bear in mind that the error term may be correlated
with education due to two kinds of endogeneity: selection bias and reverse causality.
Selection bias is related to the fact that education and fertility decisions are both af-
fected by unobservable factors, such as social and cultural norms, religious beliefs, and
family background. Usually, these factors are established and shaped during childhood
and remain constant over time. A major advantage of panel data is that we can remove
any time invariant components, including the unobserved heterogeneity related to
norms and religion, by using the within estimator. However, there are other unobserv-
able factors that affect both education and fertility and vary over time. For example,
preferences for risky behaviors (during adolescence, the predisposition to engage in
risky behavior changes) imply both a higher probability of becoming pregnant and
higher probability of educational failures.
Reverse causality is related to the fact that reproductive decisions and human capital
investment are joint decisions.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of β in Eq. 1 which do not account for both
endogeneity problems could overstate in absolute value the true effect of schooling on
fertility.
In order to solve this problem, we will apply an Instrumental Variables approach
(IV), using an instrumental variable that induces exogenous variation in schooling but
is uncorrelated with other characteristics, which affect teenage childbearing. As men-
tioned above, we use the 1993 education reform that extended the number of
mandatory years of schooling in Argentina (Ley Federal de Educación, LFE) as an
instrument for schooling (following Black et al. 2008; Silles 2011; Cygan-Rehm and
Maeder 2013; and Alzúa et al. 2016). In that sense, the LFE affects the decision to
remain and move through the educational system but it should affect fertility decisions
only through the educational channel.
To calculate IV estimates we use the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS). First,
we estimate Eq. 2 where LFEc,j,t indicates if teenagers living in province j, belonging to
birth-cohort c were affected by LFE in year t (extensive margin); and Polimodalj,t indi-
cates the share of students in Polimodal in province j, in year t (intensive margin).
2SLS allows us to combine more than one instrument in one indicator; in this case, the
number of instruments (two) is bigger than the number of endogenous variables (one),
so we estimate an overidentified model. The vector of covariates Xj,t is exactly the same
as in Eq. 1; we also include year fixed effects (λt) and birth-cohort/province fixed effects
(ηc,j). Equation 2 allows us to isolate the exogenous change in education as a response
to the reform, obtaining ^Educc;j;t . In the second stage, we replace ^Educc;j;t in Eq. 1,
obtaining β: the average causal effect of ^Educc;j;t on FRc,j,t + 1 for those women whose
educational attainment is changed by the reform.
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Equation 3 can be derived by substituting the first-stage equation (Eq. 2), into the
causal relation of interest (Eq. 1), obtaining the reduced form. The reduced form re-
gression is important because, as Angrist and Krueger (2001)11 note, if you cannot see
the causal relation of interest in the reduced form, it is probably not there. We will esti-
mate the within transformation of Eq. 3 by OLS.
2.4 Internal validity
2SLS estimates can be interpreted as causal effects for those individuals whose educa-
tional attainment is changed by the reform instruments (named compliers),12 given that
four conditions are fulfilled (Imbens and Angrist, 1994)13:
(i) Independence, reform exposure is as good as random, conditional upon the controls
included.
(ii)Exclusion restriction, the education reform should only affect fertility through its
effect on schooling choices.
(iii)First-stage, the reform must, on average, affect educational attainment in order for
it to be used as a source of exogenous variation in schooling. It is also important
that the effect on educational attainment be quite strong.
(iv)Monotonicity, rules out the existence of individuals that reduce their investments in
schooling as a result of the LFE (called defiers).
In summary, an instrument, which is as good as randomly assigned, affects the out-
come through a single known channel, has a first stage, and affects the causal channel
of interest only in one direction, can be used to estimate the average causal effect for
students who were induced by the increased schooling requirements to receive more
education (compliers). This parameter is called the local average treatment effect
(LATE). We will now discuss potential threats to the validity of these four assumptions.
The Independence assumption would be challenged if there was a correlation between
the implementation (timing or intensity) of the reform and pre-reform teenage fertility
rates in the provinces. As already mentioned, implementation of the reform was ex-
pected to induce an increasing pressure on educational facilities, i.e., provinces would
require resources from the central government. For that reason, provinces were more
likely to implement the reform early and massively if their governing political party was
the same as the national governing party (Alzúa et al. 2015).14 This suggests that the
timing and intensity of the reform both depended on political affinity between central
and provincial governments, and were thus not correlated with pre-reform fertility or
enrollment rates. Figure 5 provides some evidence supporting the exogeneity of reform
implementation and women’s fertility decisions. In most provinces, reforms took place
when teenage fertility rates were either decreasing or remaining stagnate, suggesting
the timing of the reforms was not driven by fertility trends in particular. Figure 6 sup-
ports the exogeneity of reform implementation and schooling choices.
Second, selective regional mobility may constitute a threat to the exogeneity of the
instrument (violating the Independence assumption) if parents of school children would
have moved to another province in response to the progress of the reform. Because
available data has no retrospective information, our instrument is based on current
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Fig. 5 Teenage fertility rates and implementation of education reform, by province. Argentina, 1991–2011
(number of live births per 1000 women aged 15–19). Notes: NI not implement, CABA City of Buenos Aires
(Federal District). Vertical lines indicate year of implementation of LFE by province. Source: Office of Health
Statistics DEIS and Crosta (2007); own calculations
Fig. 6 Gross enrollment rates and implementation of education reform, by province. Argentina, 1992–2011
(teenagers aged 15–19 attending any educational level, %). Notes: NI not implement, CABA City of Buenos
Aires (Federal District). Vertical lines indicate year of implementation of LFE by province. Source: Argentina
Household Survey EPH - SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank) and Crosta (2007); own calculations
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province of residence and may be therefore partly an outcome of the reform. However,
data from the Argentine Household Survey shows that, in 2000, only 3.5% of women
aged 13–19 have moved recently (in the past 5 years) from one city to another (this is
an upper bound, because it includes people who move within the same province). This
evidence suggests that regional mobility should not be a major concern.
Regarding the Exclusion restriction, if the education reform is correlated with
changes in school quality, and school quality is an omitted variable in Eq. 1, this
identification strategy may fail (Holmlund et al. 2011). We do not believe that the
education reform was accompanied by a substantial change in quality. Bet (2008)
estimates the impact of the LFE reform in Argentina on quality of secondary edu-
cation, our relevant group. He finds that, on average, the reform did not improve
performance in mathematics. Although he finds a small improvement in reading
performance, the effect is quite heterogeneous and depends on school characteris-
tics. In order to mitigate this concern, we include the public expenditure on educa-
tion as a covariate. Although it is well-known that public expenditure on education
is not a good proxy of school quality, the information available does not allow us
to include a better proxy.
Another concern is that the education reform could affect teenage fertility by other
channels related to labor market (violating the Exclusion restriction). First, extending
compulsory schooling could increase parents’ labor supply which, in turn, might affect
teenage pregnancy. We do not believe this is a plausible concern, as the reform affected
primarily disadvantaged individuals aged 13 to 15 years old, or even older students, tak-
ing into consideration the over-age of students. Given this, it seems plausible to
assume that parents did not modify the amount of hours they worked due to the
reform. Second, the education reform could affect labor market opportunities for
teenagers, affecting fertility choices. Regarding this concern, Alzúa et al. (2015)
found evidence that the reform had no effect on labor market outcomes for the
poor. The authors found an effect only for the non-poor youths. Third, the educa-
tion reform might also affect parental and children’s aspirations and expectations
about labor market outcomes, which in turn might cause a delay in pregnancy.
With respect to the change in aspirations and expectations, as mentioned above,
Bet (2008) found no major change in the quality of education. Since the change in
curricula was not very important and there were not many opportunities in the
labor market for the poor population, we think that no major change in expecta-
tions took place. In order to minimize any omitted variables related to labor mar-
ket, we include in our regressions control variables, such as the unemployment
rate, in line with the variables used by Black et al. (2008) for Norway.
The precondition for using the reform as an instrument for schooling is the existence
of a strong First-stage relationship between LFE and educational attainment, which is
verified in Section 3.2. Besides, Crosta (2007) and Alzúa et al. (2015) showed evidence
for this hypothesis.
Finally, the Monotonicity assumption fails if there are individuals who are induced by
the increased schooling requirements to drop out of school (defiers). This seems
counter-intuitive, so it seems plausible to assume there are no defiers.
We have discussed the internal validity of the two LFE indicators as instruments for
schooling in the fertility model. But one concern remains regarding the predictive value
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of the LATE, in a different context: the external validity. LATE identifies causal effects
for students who were induced by the increased schooling requirements to receive
more education (compliers). In order to make inferences for other populations, we need
to assume a constant (homogeneous) causal effect across individuals, which is a rather
restrictive assumption. In other words, compulsory schooling laws affect the schooling
decisions of a subset of individuals who differ from representative agents, because they
would not have otherwise pursued a higher level of education.
3 Results
3.1 The effect of educational reform on fertility
Table 5 reports estimations of the reduced equation (Eq. 3) of the effect of educational
reform (extensive in column 1, intensive in column 2, and combined in column 3) on
the teenage fertility rate. As can be observed, the educational reform had a statistically
significant negative extensive effect (LFE) on the teenage fertility rate for all cohorts
that were affected: a decline in the annual fertility rate of 7.5 (or 7.6) births per thou-
sand girls ages 13–19. We can also observe that the proportion of students in Polimo-
dal (a 3-year specialized cycle, after mandatory education, created by the reform) had
no statistically significant effect on teenage fertility.
These results are robust to the addition of several covariates that capture economic
activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health, and Plan Nacer
beneficiaries (columns 4 to 6). The LFE coefficient does not change qualitatively, but it
is slightly lower, ranging from 7.3 to 7.4. Again, the proportion of students in Polimodal
showed no statistically significant effect.
Reduced form estimates indicate that implementation of educational reform
(extensive margin) is relevant to explain teenage fertility decisions, while its pro-
gress and expansion is not (intensive margin). The causal relations of interest
may be hard to identify using the proportion of students in Polimodal as an in-
strument for schooling. For that reason, we will report just-identified estimates
using only the dummy variable that captures the implementation of the reform
(LFE).
3.2 The effect of the education reform on education
The reform, in order to be a valid instrument, must have a strong effect on educational
attainment. We first investigate this by considering the regression results for Eq. 2,
which are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
The reform increased education by 0.27 years on average; specifically, it increased
women’s education by 0.24 years (columns 1 and 2, panel A, Table 6). These
results are robust to the addition of covariates, coefficients do not change qualita-
tively, but they are slightly larger (columns 3 and 4, panel A, Table 6). The F-stat-
istic on the excluded instrument (LFE) is above the rule of thumb value of 10 in
all cases (a first-stage F-statistic less than 10 indicates weak instruments, according
to Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002).15 However, the partial R2 is extremely low in all
cases, that is, the variability of LFE does little to explain the variability of years of
schooling, and this result could lead to imprecise estimates in the second stage.
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Results from the over-identified model (panel B, Table 6) do not differ much from the
case in which LFE is the only instrument: LFE coefficients range from 0.25 to 0.27 add-
itional years of education. However, the proportion of students in Polimodal had no statis-
tically significant effect on years of education. The F-statistic is above the informal
threshold of 10 in columns 1 and 3, but it is below that threshold for the female popula-
tion (columns 2 and 4) indicating the presence of weak instruments. However, the null hy-
pothesis that instruments are jointly non-significant in all cases is rejected. Once again,
the partial R2 is very low in all cases.
Results for the enrollment rate are presented in Table 7. The reform increased the
enrollment rate of teenagers by 2.6 percentage points (p.p.); specifically, it increased
women’s enrollment rate by 2.9 p.p. (columns 1 and 2, panel A, Table 7). These results are
robust to the addition of covariates, coefficients do not change qualitatively, but they are
slightly bigger (columns 3 and 4, panel A, Table 7). The F-statistic is below 10 (except in
column 4), but the null hypothesis is rejected in all cases. The partial R2 is extremely low
in all cases, that is, the variability of LFE does little to explain the variability of enrollment
rates.
Table 5 The effect of educational reform on fertility (reduced form regressions). OLS estimates of
Eq. 3 (within transformation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LFE −7.518 *** (2.446) −7.632 *** (2.43) −7.333 *** (2.368) −7.415 *** (2.346)
Polimodal 0.060 (0.038) 0.061 (0.039) 0.057 (0.038) 0.058 (0.038)
Covariatesa No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.925 0.924 0.925 0.926 0.926 0.926
Obs 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764
Robust standard errors clustered at the birth-cohort/province level in parentheses. All regressions include year and birth-
cohort/province fixed effects
Source: own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
aOther covariates included are: economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health, and Plan
Nacer beneficiaries
Table 6 The effect of educational reform on years of schooling. 2SLS estimates—first stage (Eq. 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A—IV (identified)
LFE 0.27 *** (0.048) 0.24 *** (0.064) 0.27 *** (0.048) 0.25 *** (0.062)
Partial R2 0.0136 0.0080 0.0138 0.0083
F-statistic 31.4 *** 14.8 *** 32.7 *** 16.0 ***
PANEL B—IV (over-identified)
LFE 0.27 *** (0.048) 0.25 *** (0.063) 0.27 *** (0.047) 0.25 *** (0.062)
Polimodal −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
Partial R2 0.0149 0.0095 0.0157 0.0100
F-statistic 16.6 *** 8.2 *** 17.4 *** 8.8 ***
Covariatesa No No Yes Yes
Obs 1718 1718 1718 1718
Robust standard errors clustered at the birth-cohort/province level in parentheses. All regressions include year and birth-
cohort/province fixed effects. In columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is average years of schooling; in columns (2)
and (4) the dependent variable is average years of schooling of females. Source: own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
aOther covariates included are: economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health, and Plan
Nacer beneficiaries
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Results from the overidentified model (panel B, Table 7) do not differ much: LFE in-
creased enrollment rates by about 2.6 to 3 p.p. The instrument related to the share of
students in Polimodal had no statistically significant effect on enrollment rates.
Although the F-statistic does not reach the informal threshold of 10 in any case (indi-
cating the presence of weak instruments), the F-test rejects the null hypothesis in all
cases. Finally, the partial R2 is very low in all cases.
To sum up, first-stage estimates indicate that the reform, in its extensive margin, had a
statistically significant positive effect ranging from 0.24 to 0.27 additional years of school-
ing, and an effect on enrollment rates ranging from 2.6 to 3 p.p. However, the progress and
expansion of the reform (intensive margin) had no statistically significant effect on educa-
tion (neither on average years of schooling nor on enrollment rates). These results are ro-
bust to the addition of several covariates (coefficients do not change qualitatively), which
capture economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health,
and Plan Nacer beneficiaries. The F-test allows us to reject the null hypothesis that instru-
ments are jointly non-significant in all cases. However, the F-statistic is below the rule of
thumb value of 10 in some cases (indicating the presence of weak instruments) and the
partial R2 is extremely low in all cases, leading to imprecise estimates in the second stage.
3.3 The effect of education on teenage fertility
One additional year of education reduced the number of births per 1000 women
aged 13–19 by 27.7. If we consider one additional year of education for the female
population, the reduction in the number of births is larger: 30.8 (panel A, Table 8).
The results from the over-identified model (panel B, Table 8) are similar, although
coefficients are larger in absolute terms. Including covariates in the regressions re-
duces the coefficients estimated, but it does not modify the statistical significance
or the direction of these effects.
In the over-identified model, the Sargan-Hansen test allows us to analyze whether the
results are statistically different when using the Polimodal, as compared to results
Table 7 The effect of educational reform on enrollment rate. 2SLS estimates—first stage (Eq. 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A—IV (identified)
LFE 2.6 *** (0.88) 2.9 *** (0.925) 2.7 *** (0.875) 3.0 *** (0.9)
Partial R2 0.0042 0.0036 0.0044 0.0038
F-statistic 8.6 *** 9.8 *** 9.3 *** 11.1 ***
PANEL B—IV (over-identified)
LFE 2.6 *** (0.876) 2.9 *** (0.924) 2.7 *** (0.871) 3.0 *** (0.897)
Polimodal −0.012 (0.013) −0.015 (0.015) −0.011 (0.013) −0.013 (0.014)
Partial R2 0.0052 0.0047 0.0053 0.0047
F-statistic 5.3 *** 6.1 *** 5.6 *** 6.7 ***
Covariatesa No No Yes Yes
Obs 1718 1718 1718 1718
Robust standard errors clustered at the birth-cohort/province level in parentheses. All regressions include year and
birth-cohort/province fixed effects. In columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is enrollment rate; in columns
(2) and (4) the dependent variable is female enrollment rate. Source: own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
aOther covariates included are: economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health, and Plan
Nacer beneficiaries
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obtained when using LFE as the only instrument. In all cases, the null hypothesis can-
not be rejected, providing evidence of the validity of the instruments.
Results for the enrollment rate (Table 9) show that an increase of one p.p. in the
enrollment rate reduces the number of births per 1000 women aged 13–19 by 2.9. If
we consider an increase of one p.p. in the female enrollment rate, the reduction in the
number of births is smaller: 2.6 (panel A, Table 9). Once again, results from the overi-
dentified model (panel B, Table 9) are similar, although coefficients are larger in abso-
lute terms. The Sargan-Hansen test cannot reject the null hypothesis in any case, thus
indicating the validity of the instruments.
In summary, results provide evidence for a statistically significant negative impact of edu-
cation on the fertility decisions of teenagers. This negative effect operates through a human
capital effect (one additional year of schooling reduces the teenage fertility rate by roughly
26.9 to 35.5 per thousand points) and a weaker ‘incapacitation’ effect (a rise of one p.p. in
enrollment rate reduces teenage fertility rate by roughly 2.4 to 3.3 per thousand points).
Education reform LFE reduced repetition rates (Crosta 2007), which may explain the weak
‘incapacitation’ effect. For instance, after an education reform in Malawi, the average age of
Table 8 The effect of years of schooling on teenage fertility rates (human capital effect). 2SLS
estimates—second stage (Eq. 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A—IV (identified)
Schooling (years) −27.72 *** (8.804) −30.76 *** (11.397) −26.89 *** (8.557) −29.56 *** (10.98)
PANEL B—IV (over-identified)
Schooling (years) −31.97 *** (9.083) −35.53 *** (12.196) −30.82 *** (8.684) −33.63 *** (11.421)
Sargan-Hansen (p value) 0.252 0.447 0.356 0.511
Covariatesa No No Yes Yes
Obs 1718 1718 1718 1718
Robust standard errors clustered at the birth-cohort/province level in parentheses. All regressions include year and
birth-cohort/province fixed effects. In columns (1) and (3) the instrumented explanatory variable is average years
of schooling; in columns (2) and (4) the instrumented explanatory variable is average years of schooling of females. Source:
own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
aOther covariates included are: economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health, and Plan
Nacer beneficiaries
Table 9 The effect of enrollment rates on teenage fertility rates (‘incapacitation’ effect). 2SLS
estimates—second stage (Eq. 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A—IV (identified)
Enrollment rate −2.904 ** (1.181) −2.600 *** (1.001) −2.743 ** (1.094) −2.450 *** (0.921)
PANEL B—IV (over-identified)
Enrollment rate −3.318 *** (1.18) −2.934 *** (1.006) −3.125 *** (1.1) −2.780 *** (0.936)
Sargan-Hansen (p value) 0.591 0.664 0.554 0.599
Covariatesa No No Yes Yes
Obs 1718 1718 1718 1718
Robust standard errors clustered at the birth-cohort/province level in parentheses. All regressions include year and
birth-cohort/province fixed effects. In columns (1) and (3) the instrumented explanatory variable is enrollment rate;
in columns (2) and (4) the instrumented explanatory variable is female enrollment rate. Source: own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
aOther covariates included are: economic activity, unemployment, public expenditure on education and health, and Plan
Nacer beneficiaries
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students declined, due to lower rates of grade repetition; and the reduction in the time girls
remain in school substantially weakened the ‘incapacitation’ effect (Grant 2015).
Although the estimated effects are very large, we should remember that LATE identifies
causal effects for the group complying with the reform (i.e., young people who did not leave
school after 7 years because of the reform and, otherwise, would not have pursued a higher
level of education). This group is not necessarily representative of the overall population.
4 Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of education on teenage fertility for
Argentina by applying an Instrumental Variables approach, using a 1993 education reform
that increased compulsory schooling from 7 to 10 years (Ley Federal de Educación) as an
instrument for education. Our identification strategy takes advantage of an exogenous vari-
ation in education generated by the staggered implementation of the reform, which re-
sponds to political affinity between central and provincial governments (Alzúa et al. 2015).
The education reform seems to have had a significant and positive effect on educational
outcomes. Implementation of the reform generated an increase in years of schooling by
0.24 to 0.27 additional years, and an increase in school enrollment rates by 2.6 to 3 per-
centage points (extensive margin). However, the reform’s progress and expansion showed
no impact on the stock of human capital or enrollment (intensive margin).
Results provide evidence of a statistically significant negative impact of education on the
fertility decisions of teenagers. This negative effect operates through a human capital chan-
nel (one additional year of schooling reduced the teenage fertility rate by roughly 26.9 to
35.5 per thousand points) and a weaker ‘incapacitation’ effect (an increase of one percent-
age point in the enrollment rate reduced the teenage fertility rate by roughly 2.4 to 3.3 per
thousand points). Education reform LFE reduced repetition rates (Crosta 2007), which may
explain the weak ‘incapacitation’ effect (similar to the case of Malawi; Grant 2015).
Although the estimated effects are very large, we should interpret the results as the
local average treatment effect (LATE) for the group complying with the reform (i.e., for
young people who did not leave school after 7 years because of the reform). This group
is not necessarily representative of the overall population.
Reducing early motherhood is a major policy concern due to its adverse conse-
quences on the child and the mother’s health, on socioeconomic variables (intra- and
inter-generational) and for its public cost. There is evidence that education plays a sig-
nificant role in fertility decision-making processes among teenagers (Duflo et al. 2015;
Black et al. 2008; Baird et al. 2011; Cortés et al. 2010, 2016; Berthelon and Kruger 2011;
Silles 2011; Cygan-Rehm and Maeder 2013; and Novella and Ripani 2016). This
research contributes to the literature for the case of Argentina, where investing in edu-
cation may be a powerful tool to reduce teenage fertility.
Endnotes
1Literature on fertility distinguishes between direct (proximate) and indirect (distal)
determinants. Proximate determinants are biological and behavioral factors (marriage,
contraception, abortion and postpartum infecundity) through which education and
others socioeconomic, cultural and environmental ‘background’ variables affect fertility
(Bongaarts 1978 and 1982).
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2Higher earnings raise the opportunity costs of leaving the labor market to bear a child
(negative ‘substitution effect’); but higher earnings should be positively related to fertility
because families can afford more children (positive ‘income effect’). However, the substitu-
tion effect dominates the income effect under the usual assumption that parents with
higher income prefer to invest more in each child (quantity-quality tradeoff).
3Under positive assortative mating a woman’s education is causally connected to her
mate’s education, so that the effect of education on household permanent income is
augmented through a multiplier effect.
4Birth postponement may be temporary and does not necessarily affect completed fertility.
5An exception is McCrary and Royer (2011) who do not find any causal effect of educa-
tion on fertility behavior for the United States. The seemingly conflicting evidence could
be due to differences in the type of intervention involved. While in all studies the number
of years of schooling increases, the intervention examined by McCrary and Royer (2011)
affected school entrance decisions whereas Black et al. (2008), Silles (2011) and Cygan-
Rehm and Maeder (2013) investigate reforms that affected school exit decisions. The latter
type of intervention is likely to matter more for women who desire to have children early
in life but who wish to avoid violating compulsory schooling laws. Prolonging compulsory
school by one year will possibly lead such women to postpone childbearing by the same
amount of time. Compared to interventions that manipulate school entry age, school exit
policies are therefore likely to capture not only the effect of increased human capital, but
also that of the mechanical delay related to the woman’s desire not to violate the law.
6Argentina, Bahamas, Belice, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
7Law 24195, 14 April 1993.
8We would like to determine the share of pregnant teenagers (i.e., teenage pregnancy rate),
regardless of the pregnancy outcome. However, we only have information for one pregnancy
outcome: live births. We will use fertility rates as a proxy of pregnancy rates. The difference be-
tween these two variables is explained by stillbirths, spontaneous abortion, and induced abor-
tion. Due to the illegal nature of induced abortion, the information is scarce, making it difficult
to measure its magnitude. Official data indicate that in 2013 there were about 8200 hospital
discharges for teenage abortions (15-19 years old). “Information on hospital discharges due to
abortion has several limitations, since it only reflects the public subsector and does not include
care in the private system or the consultations by guard, which, considering the increasing use of
abortion with medication and the resolution of the consultations of incomplete abortion by
guard without hospitalization, would imply an underregistration of the number of women who
consult the health system after an abortion” (Binstock and Gogna 2013). These figures consti-
tute a “floor” for the number of abortions in adolescents, which would raise the 2013 fertility
rate from 64.9‰ to 69.6‰ for young women between 15 and 19 years old.
9Usually these indicators include women aged 10-19, but the number of mothers
younger than 13 years old was very low, even zero for some year/provinces.
10Plan Nacer is a targeted public health insurance program available for uninsured
women who were pregnant or had recently given birth (up to 45 days post-delivery),
and children under 6 years of age. The program began in 2004, and uses results-based
payments at the provincial and health facility level. It includes a specific package of
services which enrolled individuals receive free of charge. Provinces are paid a
Alzúa and Velázquez IZA Journal of Development and Migration  (2017) 7:7 Page 20 of 23
capitation fee for enrolling qualified beneficiaries, and health facilities receive fee-for-
service payments for providing services.
11Cited in Angrist and Pischke (2009).
12We can divide the population into four subgroups, defined by their reactions to the
instrument: those induced by the increased schooling requirements to receive more
education (compliers); those who will attend school with or without the LFE (always-
takers); those who will not attend college, even after the law (never-takers); and those
who reduce their investments in schooling as a result of the LFE (defiers).
13Cited in Angrist and Pischke (2009).
14Alzúa et al. (2015) estimate a hazard model (Jenkins, 1995) of the probability of
implementing the reform. The only variable that was significant in most of the specifi-
cations was the political party. If the reform is uncorrelated with observed time-varying
factors, it is less likely that it is correlated with unobserved time-varying factors that
could be also affecting the outcomes of interest (labor market/educational outcomes).
15Cited in Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Appendix
Fig. 7 Birth-cohorts affected by the reform. Note: CABA City of Buenos Aires (Federal District). Source: Crosta
(2007), own elaboration
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